This paper finds that Nevada, the second most popular state for out-of-state incorporations after Delaware, attracts firms that have a large and significant likelihood of reporting financial results that later require restatement. Compared with Delaware and other states, restatement likelihoods for Nevada-incorporated firms are nearly double on an unconditional basis, and 40% higher when controlling for firm-level characteristics. We also show that shareholders in Nevada firms that restate lose a large amount of value in the year following the restatement, significantly more so than restating firms incorporated in other states, including Delaware. Our results suggest that Nevada corporate law attracts a certain class of firms that are prone to financial reporting failures and that these failures are followed by significant losses to shareholder value. To the extent that such reporting failures proxy for higher agency costs, our findings indicate that firms may self-select a legal system that matches their desirable level of privatebenefit consumption, and that Nevada competes to attract firms with higher agency costs.
Introduction
For a period spanning at least 30 years if not longer, legal scholars have debated whether competition across U.S. states to attract corporate charters leads to a "race to the top" or a "race to the bottom" in terms of how states structure corporate law. Advocates of the "race to the top" argue that competition induces states to adopt laws that protect shareholders, and in particular, shareholder value against encroachment by managers. 1 Those arguing the "race to the bottom" assert that states enact corporate laws that protect managers and large owners at the expense of overall shareholder wealth.
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By focusing on one winner, the race-to-the-top-versus-bottom debate overlooks a potentially richer market for corporate incorporations. Namely, states might differ in the types of firms they want to attract. Within this sort of market, some states could specialize in offering legal and institutional structures with strong protections for shareholders, while other states may be incented to offer weaker protections for shareholders and stronger protections for managers. In turn, firms with heterogeneous preferences for legal protections, and the costs associated with those protections, selfselect into the legal regime that best fits their corporate structure. Some firms may select "high protection" states, others could select "low protection" states, and still others may select dimensions not having much to do with corporate law (i.e., by choosing to remain in their a state in which the company was founded).
This paper provides novel evidence that companies self-select into a particular legal regime by examining the behavior of publicly traded firms that incorporate in Nevada. With 6.7% of all public incorporations by firms in states outside of their headquarter-state, Nevada is second to Delaware in attracting out-of-state incorporations (see Table 1 ). As of 2008, Nevada was corporate home to 255 publicly traded companies containing at least rudimentary financial information in Compustat.
Promotions for the state make no secret of Nevada's desire to compete for out-ofstate incorporations. Recent web-based advertisements for Nevada incorporation include tag-lines such as "The Expert's Domestic Haven of Choice", "You Can Live Anywhere and Still Incorporate In Tax Free, Lawsuit Proof, Private Nevada", "Why Nevada?", and "Control Everything and Own Nothing". 3 The website for the Nevada Secretary of State states that the Nevada business court "minimizes the time, cost and risks of commercial litigation" as a reason to incorporate in Nevada. 4 Meanwhile, the Nevada legislature has adopted a strategy of enacting corporate laws that are explicitly more manager-friendly than Delaware. For instance, Nevada law provides fairly broad limitations on manager and board liability and protects management from takeovers using the business judgment rule rather than the enhanced fiduciary standards required in Delaware. Overall, Nevada appears to be a state that is ripe for attracting firms seeking a corporate law that is more lax than in Delaware and other states.
To explore further the idea that firms self-select a lax legal structure by incorporating in Nevada, we investigate variation in corporate disclosure quality as a function of state-of-incorporation. In particular, we focus on the frequency that companies incorporated within a given state are required to "restate" earlier financial disclosures that are found later to be incorrect. Accounting restatements are generally considered bad news. Restatements result in a significant negative market stock price reaction (Coffee (2005)), reduce the credibility of the reporting company (Anderson and Yohn (2002) , are frequently preceded by balance sheet "bloat" (Ettredge, Scholz Smith and Sun 2010), and tend to be associated with weak corporate control (Baber, Kand and Liang (2006) ). The likelihood of observing a restatement alsoincreases significantly with CEO holdings of in-the-money stock options (Efendi 2007) . 5 The evidence suggests that restatements are associated, at the very least, with aggressive accounting tactics and are likely to reflect the ability for company insiders to consume private benefits of control. 5 Consistent with this finding, Bebchuk and Bar-Gill (2002) develop a model demonstrating how compensation could incentivize managers to misreport. 6 Restatements could result from a range of reasons from intentional fraud to mere sloppiness. Arlen and Carney have argued and provided evidence that financial fraud is many times a result of a last period agency problem (Arlen and Carney (1992) ). Managers can benefit from overstating performance since damages fall mostly on the corporation (Arlen and Carney (1992) , Coffee (2006) , Klausner (2010) ). Mere sloppiness in reporting could also reflect an agency problem as it suggests that not enough effort or carefulness is given by management to reporting. To examine the robustness of the findings in Figure 1 , we first compare the types of public firms incorporating in Nevada to those that incorporate in Delaware and in other states. We find that Nevada firms tend to be much smaller and less profitable than Delaware firms, although potential growth opportunities -as measured by the ratio of the market value to book value of assets -tend to be much larger in Nevada firms. Nevada firms are also relatively young: the median Nevada firm is one year younger than the median Delaware firm and a full three years younger than the median across all states.
Clearly, Nevada firms are of a different type than those that incorporate in Delaware and other states.
We next examine firm-level restatement behavior as a function of state-ofincorporation, holding constant a variety of firm-level characteristics and by controlling for industry and year fixed effects. After controlling for these effects, we find that Nevada firms are 30 to 40% more likely to restate their financials than other states.
Delaware restatement patterns, on the other hand, are not statistically distinguishable from the other non-Nevada states. These results continue to hold when we narrow are set of restatements to those that result in reductions in earnings, and importantly, to those restatements that lead to fraud indictments or regulatory investigations. In fact, the subset of restatements that are later investigated for fraud or other misbehaviors produce some of our strongest results.
The sample period we examine is too short to draw inferences about the impact of the passage of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) on restatement frequencies. While Figure 1 shows a large run-up in restatements following the passage of SOX, particularly in Nevada, the figure also exhibits a significant decline in restatements after 2006. The 2006 "bulge" in restatements could reflect adjustments to the stricter disclosures required under SOX. Alternatively, the bulge could reflect a pro-cyclical run up in stock prices and easy credit during this period. According to this latter explanation, companies misreport financials more frequently in an effort to keep the momentum in stock prices. Distinguishing between these two explanations requires restatement data through another credit cycle.
We also explore the causality of the "Nevada effect". Our maintained hypothesis is that lax Nevada law attracts firms that are more likely to engage in behavior leading to accounting restatements. However, an alternative explanation is that the lax law creates an environment that causes otherwise "good" firms to engage in risky and aggressive accounting behavior. Using both firm fixed effects and instrumental variables regressions, we uncover no evidence suggesting that Nevada law causes higher restatement activity. Consistent with this finding, we also show that when a firm chooses to incorporate in Delaware or Nevada rather than its home state (i.e., the state in which it is headquartered), the propensity to choose Nevada over Delaware declines in the degree to which the home-state corporate law is pro-management, as measured by the state-level anti-takeover protection index developed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2002 (Barzuza (2010) ).
Our results also provide insight into how agency costs within a firm can affect its choice of law. Past research has noted that heterogeneity across firms will affect their preferences for choice of law. For instance, firms differ in how many defensive tactics are included in their corporate charters following an IPO (Daines and Klausner (2001) Field and Karpoff (2002) ) and how firms vary in measures of corporate governance quality (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2002) ). These results suggest that certain firms -possibly those larger agency problems --choose states with stronger manager protection.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides more theoretical background for our paper and reviews related literature. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics on the sample. Section 4 presents the regression results. Section 5 concludes.
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Background and literature review

Delaware
For many years, the literature has debated the desirability of allowing U.S.
corporations to choose their state of incorporation and therefore the corporate law that applies to them. Early papers in the debate assume that competition exists across states, and view this competition as either a "race to the top," where winning states produce efficient and socially desirable laws that also typically maximize shareholder wealth (Easterboork and Fischel (1991) , Romano (1985 , 1993 , 2001 ) Winter (1977 ), or a "race to the bottom," in which states produce laws that are inefficient, benefiting managers at the expense of shareholders (Cary (1974) Bebchuk (1992) , Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999) ).
Because Delaware attracts a substantial proportion of incorporations of all medium to large-sized firms, including the majority of publicly traded companies, and because other states face barriers to entry and political impediments, recent work even argues that Delaware faces no real competition from other states (Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002) , Kahan and Kamar (2002) when a federal court interpretation of Nevada law interpreted the state's antitakeover law to follow Delaware precedent, the Nevada legislature stepped in to correct this interpretation by explicitly adopting the lenient business judgment rule as the benchmark for adjudicating over the use of defensive takeover tactics. 13 Thus, Nevada does not compete by emulating Delaware law. Rather, Nevada offers a different package than Delaware, one that is more protective to managers, including insiders that might have stronger appetite for engaging in behavior suggestive of significant agency problems. For this reason, we refer to Nevada law as "lax."
In the next section, we turn to the data used in our comparison of the behavior of firms in Nevada vis-à-vis Delaware and other states.
13 Referring to Delaware enhanced standards in ITT v. Hilton, the U.S. District court for the District of Nevada noted in dicta that,
[t]his Court will not eliminate the principles articulated in Unocal, Blasius and Revlon and the common law duties of care and loyalty without any indication from the Nevada Legislature or the Nevada Supreme Court that that is the legislative intent. Following the Hilton decision, the Nevada legislature stepped in to replace Delaware standards with the business judgment rule (see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.139 (West 2008) ) .The legislative history suggests that the amendment was intended to ensure that the Hilton decision was limited to circumstances that involve interference with shareholder voting rights:
[T]he members of the executive committee agree with the Hilton Court's emphasis on the importance of shareholder franchise. They believe the court's action in enjoining the ITT restructuring plan was correct because the plan did infringe on the powers of the stockholders to remove directors under the circumstances. However, the Executive Committee believes the decision contained language which could be interpreted [emphasis added] too broadly and wishes to clarify Nevada law by changing NRS 78.138. If actions taken in response to takeover threats do not involve the disenfranchisement of stockholders the directors should obtain the benefits of the BJR without first having to establish (i) that management had reasonable grounds to believe a danger existed to the corporation, and (ii) that the response to the takeover danger was , 1999 pt1.pdf (1999) .) Hilton dealt with the most severe case of managers' use of defensive tactics-interference with shareholder franchise. In such a case, Delaware, as well as many other states, would apply the Blasius standard-which requires managers to show a compelling justification for their acts-due to the importance of shareholder voting power as a safety valve in the presence of a pill.
Data and Summary Statistics
To examine whether the lax laws of Nevada have some economic consequence, we examine firm tendencies to revise or restate audited financial statements as a function of the state in which they are incorporated.
We gather data for restatements resulting from the misreporting of financial information via Audit Analytics, which provides firm-level information on audit-induced financial restatements ("Auditor Engagements and Earnings Restatements") for over 20,000 firms starting in 2000. The database flags the restatement and provides accounting and accounting related information on the restatement, including measures of the severity of the restatement. Table 3 provides some summary information on the restatement activity for our Table 3 reports average annual restatement frequencies, defined to be the percentage of sample firms incorporated in each state that report at least one restatement during the year. On average, 14.5% of the firms incorporated in Nevada restated accounting figures each year during our sample period. By comparison, Delaware firms and firms in other states restated at a frequency of 8.9% and 8.5%, respectively. Thus, restatement frequencies in Nevada were more than 60% higher than the average for all other states, including Delaware. Panel A of Table 3 also reports subsets of the restatement frequencies, including only those restatements that result in a decline in reported net income, and those restatements resulting in a follow up 13 investigation for suspected fraud or some other regulatory infraction. The pattern of higher reported restatements in Nevada persists across these two breakdowns.
For a more detailed exposure to the restatement activities of Nevada firms, refer to Appendix Table A3 . In that table, we report excerpts from SEC disclosure of a randomly selected group of Nevada firms that restate their financials. The table shows that the reasons for restatements vary considerably, from incorrect applications of derivative costing formulas, to mixing up operating and financial cash flows, to wrongly attributing expenditures on work-in-progress and inventory to revenues. Table 3 reports the average impact of restatements on net income and the book value of shareholders equity, both measured as a percentage of a company's reported assets. The downward adjustment to net income and equity for restating Nevada firms appears to be of lower magnitude than for restating firms in Delaware and other states. However, this result likely stems from a reporting bias. Panel B also shows that the reported adjustments for restating Nevada firms are missing for nearly three-quarters of the cases, compared with roughly 40% missing in Delaware and other states.
Panel B of
We suspect that the higher rate of missing accounting adjustments in Nevada are related to less detailed reports in 10-Ks and 10-Qs, which could be an artifact Nevada firms are much smaller and younger than their publicly traded peers in other states (see Table 4 ), they rely on less sophisticated reporting techniques. In support of this contention, the last row of Panel B reports the proportion of restating firms that used a "Big-4" audit firm at the time of the restatement. To run our firm-level regressions, we first construct a series of variables related to the performance and riskiness of the firms we examine. Exploring how Nevada firms differ along the dimensions of these variables is interesting alone, but these variables also act as controls in our regressions. To measure the market's assessment of the value of the firm relative to its historical cost, we include Tobin's Q, measured as the ratio market value of firm assets (market value of equity plus book value of interest-bearing debt) to book value of firm assets (book value of equity plus book value of interest bearing debt).
As a measure of Profitability, we include earnings before interest depreciation and amortization, scaled by the market value of assets. To control for the level of financial leverage, we use the book value of interest bearing debt divided by the market value of assets, and as measures of firm size we examine both the market value of equity (Log MVE), defined as the year-end common shares outstanding times the year-end stock price, and the market value of assets (Log MVA), defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of interest bearing debt. 15 Finally, for the subset of firms in our sample for which data are available, we also include a measure of the Age of the firm, measured as the number of years the firm has been publicly listed and tracked by CRSP.
To be included in our sample, we require firms to have complete data in
Compustat for calculating Tobin's Q, Profitability, Leverage, and Log MVA for four consecutive years. Once we include Age of the firm, we are left with a regression sample containing 32,998 firm-year observations on 4,456 different firms.
We calculate several other firm-level variables of interest. Insider > 15% and Institutional > 15% are indicator variables that equal one when an insider (executive managers and board members) or institution owns more than 15% of the outstanding shares of a company. G Index is the measure of "good" corporate governance, as defined by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2002) and E index is the refinement of the G index proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) . Table   6 , the larger Tobin's Q among Nevada firms disappears once we control for firm and risk characteristics in regressions. Table A2 of the appendix also 6 reports the distribution of companies across 2-digit NAIC industries, sorted according to state of incorporation. Nevada-incorporated firms tend to be more concentrated in the mining, construction and the entertainment industries than other states (including Delaware), and tend to have a lower proportion of firms in manufacturing and information technology. Outside of these industries, the distribution of Nevada firms across industries is reflective of other publicly traded firms. to account for the correlation induced by using the same firms in multiple years. We are interested in the magnitude of the "Nevada" effect, as measured by the coefficient estimate on NV Corp after controlling for the observed variation in firm-level performance and risk characteristics. We also investigate causality of the "Nevada effect" along two dimensions without including the results in tables. First, we add firm fixed effects to the regression specifications in Table 5 . Note that once we control for firm fixed effects, the only variation in state of incorporation occurs through corporate migrations from one state to another. Thus, adding firm fix effects tests whether restatement activities increase when firms move their state of incorporation to Nevada during our sample period. Once we control for firm fixed effects, the Nevada dummy is statistically insignificant. While the number of migrations to Nevada is small and therefore may not have a lot of power to detect a Nevada causal effect (see Table 2 ), we interpret these results to suggest that the Nevada effect is driven by the selection of high-restating firms into Nevada. Second, we use geographic location of a company's headquarters as an instrument for Nevada incorporation. Location west of the Mississippi is positively related to incorporation in
Regression results
Restatement regressions
Nevada and yet should not be correlated with the likelihood of restating accounting disclosures. We find that the Nevada effect once again disappears once we substitute the instrument in for Nevada. This finding is also consistent with the Nevada effect being one of high-restatement firms selecting the law, rather the law causing high restatements.
Tobin's Q regressions
While the results above suggest that Nevada firms adopt more aggressive accounting procedures that lead to high restatement activity, the results alone do not suggest that this behavior creates a net cost to Nevada firm shareholders, or that Nevada firms are somehow less valuable than firms from other states. This is because the effect of lax law on firm value and performance is unclear. While high restatement activities appear to be associated with higher agency and regulatory costs, and often lead to downward revisions in firm stock price upon announcement, there could also be shareholder benefits to lax law. Namely, managers of some companies may feel that strict corporate law impinges on their ability to make creative, value-increasing decisions. For instance, value-maximizing managers of high-risk, high payoff companies could eschew a strong corporate-law state such as Delaware if they assess the downside risks of liability-related litigation to be high.
To take a first-step exploration of the valuation implications for residing in Nevada and to attempt to measure the impact of restatements on this value, Table 6 reports results of Tobin's Q regressions on Nevada, Delaware, and restatement dummy The first thing to note from the regressions in Table 6 
Gains to incorporating in Nevada
We argue that certain firms may self-select lax law in Nevada to avoid the protections in a stronger law state like Delaware. As further support for this argument, we examine the potential gains for a firm from incorporated in Nevada versus Delaware as a function of their protections in their headquarter state. and for states that are west of the Mississippi. The dependent variable in the regression is the log ratio of numbers of incorporations (+1) in Nevada, from each headquarter state, divided by the numbers of incorporations (+1) in Delaware from the same state.
The negative and statistically significant sign on the Antitakeover index coefficient in Table 7 shows that headquarter states with stronger manager protections protection lose relatively fewer companies to Nevada. The findings are consistent with the view that the firms that incorporate in Nevada are attracted by its pro-management tilt.
Conclusion
This paper finds that firms incorporated in Nevada, the state second only to To the extent that such reporting failures proxy for higher agency costs, our findings indicate that firms may self-select a legal system that matches their desirable level of private-benefit consumption, and that Nevada competes to attract firms with higher agency costs. Tobin's Q to be the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets; Profitability to be the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to the market value of assets; Leverage to be the book value of interest bearing debt divided by the market value of assets, Log MVE to be the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (year end stock price times number of shares outstanding), Log MVA to be the natural logarithm of the market value of assets (book value of interest bearing debt plus market value of equity), and Age to be the number of years since the firm has been publicly listed, according to the length of time it has been tracked by CRSP. From Thomas Reuters, we collect information on concentrated equity ownership and define Insider > 15% to be an indicator variable that equals one when insiders -managers, board members, auditors, and their families -own 15 percent or more of the outstanding equity. Institutional > 15% is an indicator variable that equals one when institutional investors own 15 percent or more of outstanding equity. Finally, from RiskMetrics, we construct G index to be the Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2002) index of good corporate governance and E index is refinement of the G Index proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009 The panels below present estimates of the marginal effects of Nevada and Delaware incorporation dummy variables on the likelihood that a firm restates it accounting figures. Panel A reports the regression results by identifying all restatements in the dependent variable, Panel B flags only those restatements that lead to a reduction in reported net income, and Panel C focuses only on restatements suspected of fraud or some other regulatory infraction. NV Corp is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm is incorporated in Nevada. DE Corp is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm is incorporated in Delaware. NV HQ equals one when a firm is headquarted in Nevada.
From Compustat, we define Tobin's Q to be the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets; Profitability to be the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to the market value of assets; Leverage to be the book value of interest bearing debt divided by the market value of assets, Log MVE to be the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (year end stock price times number of shares outstanding), and Log MVA to be the natural logarithm of the market value of assets. Age is the number of years since the firm has been publicly listed, according to the length of time it has been tracked by CRSP. From Thomas Reuters, we collect information on concentrated equity ownership and define Insider > 15% to be an indicator variable that equals one when insiders own 15 percent or more of the outstanding equity. Institutional > 15% is an indicator variable that equals one when institutional investors own 15 percent or more of outstanding equity. Each panel reports specifications with and without Age and with and without industry and year fixed effects.
Panel A: All Restatements This table reports estimates from regressions of Tobin's Q on a set on Nevada and Delaware dummy variables, and whether or not a firm restated financials in the previous year, along with a set of control variables. We calculate Tobin's Q using Compustat figures. It is defined to be the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets, where market value of assets is constructed by adding the book value of interest bearing debt to the market value of equity (year end stock price times number of shares outstanding).. NV Corp is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm is incorporated in Nevada. DE Corp is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm is incorporated in Delaware. NV HQ equals one when a firm is headquarted in Nevada. Using Compustat, we define Profitability as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to the market value of assets; Leverage as the book value of interest bearing debt divided by the market value of assets, Log MVE as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, and Log MVA as the natural logarithm of the market value of assets. Age is the number of years since the firm has been publicly listed, according to the length of time it has been tracked by CRSP. From Thomas Reuters, we collect information on concentrated equity ownership and define Insider > 15% to be an indicator variable that equals one when insiders own 15 percent or more of the outstanding equity. Institutional > 15% is an indicator variable that equals one when institutional investors own 15 percent or more of outstanding equity. Restatements equals one when a firm restates its financials at least one time during the year. The subscript t-1 refers to the value of the variable, lagged one year relative to the dependent variable.
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